Entry strategy of Japanese multinationals into India: a case study of selected firms.
Japanese Multinationals have known to flock together into a country and set up operations. This clustering was often directed by its MITI (now known as METI). However in the case of investing in India, no such trend can be seen. Rather, the driving force for the early entrants has been their foresight on opportunities in India and for the later entrants it was the success of their competitors. Strategically, all of them located themselves in green-field areas to build on the advantages in terms of assistance offered by the government and sourcing of raw talent that could be moulded. They believed that by locating their companies in green-field areas, they could promote the philosophy of Japanese management into their operations which continues to be vital for Japanese multinationals.

Article Type:
Case study
International business enterprises (Case studies)
Foreign investments (Forecasts and trends)
International economic relations
Choudhury, Srabani Roy
Pub Date:
Name: International Journal of Strategic Management Publisher: International Academy of Business and Economics Audience: Academic Format: Magazine/Journal Subject: Business, international Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2011 International Academy of Business and Economics ISSN: 1555-2411
Date: August, 2011 Source Volume: 11 Source Issue: 2
Event Code: 010 Forecasts, trends, outlooks Computer Subject: Market trend/market analysis
Product Code: 9103010 Intnl Economic Policy; 9919600 Intnl Economic Relations; 9920000 Multinational Corporations NAICS Code: 92611 Administration of General Economic Programs
Geographic Scope: Japan; India Geographic Code: 9JAPA Japan; 9INDI India
Accession Number:
Full Text:

The last two decades of the 20th century witnessed a dramatic world-wide increase in foreign direct investment (FDI), accompanied by a marked change in the attitude of most developing countries towards inward FDI. As against a highly suspicious attitude of these countries towards inward FDI in the past, most countries now regard it as beneficial for their development efforts and compete with each other to attract it. Today, the developing countries use foreign direct investment (FDI) as an engine of growth. For a developing country, it is the vehicle through which capital is provided and efficiency induced in the industrial sector. The firm in the country of origin is encouraged to invest in the developing country because of the lower resource costs, a growing market and restrictive import policies. Foreign direct investment is, therefore, an intertwining of interests of both the host and the home country. A firm that undertakes foreign direct investment gets involved in the purchase of an existing enterprise or facilities, establishing and managing new ones and/or participating in the management of an enterprise in a foreign country. It therefore requires the firm to conduct operations in the foreign country either through overseas subsidiaries or through joint ventures. Studies conducted so far have concentrated mainly on studying trends, patterns and location issues with respect to FDI, and therefore, have dwelt on the macro factors and policy orientations of both the host country as well as the country of origin. Though these dominate the movement of FDI into the host country, a neglected area of research, as pointed out by Meyer (2003), has been an analysis at the firm level of the conditions and externalities that help or those which may deter the FDI flow.

This paper is an effort to understand the parameters considered by the Japanese firms while entering the Indian market. The study looks into the methodology of entry strategy of eight Japanese firms across different sectors. A thumbnail sketch of the selected firms is given below in tabular form.

Highlights of these selected companies are that first, apart from the familiar Japanese FDI firms in the automobile sector, firms from the pharmaceutical sector, agricultural machinery sector and the chemical sector were chosen to understand if there are any differences in entry strategy. Secondly, two distinct groups can be identified in those which entered just after opening up of the economy in 1993 and those that came in post 2001 when a more liberalized policy was adopted in many sectors. At the firm level it essentially allowed the 'automatic route' in more number of sectors (where prior government approval is not required for FDI), as well as the fact that foreign direct investment was increased to 100 percent, thus allowing for wholly owned subsidiaries. Thirdly, sectors like agricultural equipment and pharmaceutical industry were chosen as they are sunrise industry in India. The idea for this kind of selection was to bring in diversity thus allowing for a more insightful understanding. The focus of this study is to understand the entry strategy of Japanese firms, and especially, how they identify their Indian partners.


The study was conducted on the basis of a questionnaire circulated to the organisations concerned, prior to the setting up of interviews with key personnel. The questionnaire used open-ended questions since the main objective was to get the opinion of the respondents. Before the visit, some guidelines were drawn up to provide direction to the interviews with select managers, of whom at least one was Japanese. Since the top management of these companies was the target group, the interviews were conducted in a conversational manner in order to gather more information. A recording facility was used wherever permitted. In most of the companies, a plant visit was also arranged. The companies sent the completed questionnaires through electronic mail, at a later date.

Foreign direct Investment Regime of India

Independent India started off in the path of economic development with a strong state presence. By the 1970's, India had moved towards sustainable development with a strong policy of import substitution. FDI was discouraged by India, as it was seen as an encroachment of economic independence. The outcome was (a) imposing severe limits on equity holdings by foreigners and (b) restricting FDI to the production of only a few researched items.

India's story of foreign direct investment (FDI) participation began with the opening up of selected sectors of the economy in 1991 as an initiative under the large umbrella of economic reform. Under a new industrial policy, foreign participation was allowed in the form of equity participation of up to 51 percent in high priority sectors. This was the first phase which lasted till around 1995. Subsequently, the Government of India has progressively opened up the economy to many other sectors and has also allowed for 100% equity participation in some sectors. By far, today, the policy for FDI allows freedom of location, choice of technology, and repatriation of capital and dividends.


According to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, "FDI Policy permits FDI up to 100% investment from foreign/NRI investors without prior approval in most of the sectors including the services sector through the automatic route. FDI in sectors/activities under the automatic route does not require any prior approval either by the Government or the RBI. The investors are required to notify the Regional office concerned of RBI receipt of inward remittances within 30 days of such receipt and will have to file the required documents with that office within 30 days after issue of shares to the investors." i Prior Government approval for FDI/NRI is necessary for any activity that is not covered under the automatic route. The sectors that do not come under the automatic route are Gambling and Betting, the Lottery Business, Business of chit fund, Nidhi Company", Housing and Real Estate business, Trading in Transferable Development Rights (TDRs), Retail Trading, Atomic Energy, Agricultural or plantation activities or Agriculture (excluding Floriculture, Horticulture, Development of Seeds, Animal Husbandry, Pisciculture and Cultivation of Vegetables, Mushrooms etc. under controlled conditions and services related to agro and allied sectors) and Plantations (other than Tea plantations). The Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) is the government agency which approves all proposals that require government approval. The Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Department of Industrial Policy and Promotions are the other agents who play a major role in assisting FDI follow up.

To attract FDI, India has set up special physical locations where foreign companies can operate and avail of various benefits. These areas come under the domain of the state government and are overseen by the central government. These are:

a. Special Economic Zones: 100% FDI is permitted under automatic route for setting up of Special Economic Zone (SEZ). Units in SEZ qualify for approval through automatic route subject to sectoral norms. Details about the type of activities permitted are available in the Foreign Trade Policy issued by the Department of Commerce. Proposals not covered under the automatic route require approval by FIPB.

b. Export Oriented Units (EOUs): 100% FDI is permitted under automatic route for setting up 100% EOU, subject to sectoral norms. Proposals not covered under the automatic route would be considered and approved by FIPB.

c. Industrial Park: 100% FDI is permitted under automatic route for setting up of an Industrial Park.

d. Electronic Hardware Technology Park (EHTP) Units: All proposals for FDI/NRI investment in EHTP Units are eligible for approval under the automatic route. For proposals that are not covered under the automatic route, the applicant should seek separate approval of the FIPB.

e. Software Technology Park Units: All proposals for FDI/NRI investment in STP Units are eligible for approval under automatic route. For proposals not covered under automatic route, the applicant should seek separate approval of the FIPB.


In India, FDI operates through subsidiaries or joint ventures with Indian partners. At the firm level, FDI goes through three specific phases, and to understand the firm's experience, each phase has to be scrutinised separately. The first phase is when a firm initiates the process of targeting the Indian market. There are various reasons for entry into a market--for a Japanese firm, it is primarily for access to the local market and to expand it for its own product(s).

Until recently, Japanese foreign direct investment into India has been significantly lower when compared with FDI in other Asian countries. At the firm level, this means that a large number of companies have shied away from investing in India. One reason that is often quoted for this is that India is not perceived as a viable destination for investment by Japanese firms as it has alternative locations in its immediate neighbouring countries and South East Asian countries.

Entry Strategy of Japanese Firms into India

As India emerged as a market with a strong potential for growth, some Japanese companies took the initiative to invest in India. For most investing companies, competitors had already set foot in India. Moreover, the central and state government policies were encouraging enough to make India an alternative option for them.

India as a destination for FDI hinges on two important factors- low cost advantage and a growing domestic market. While these factors drive FDI from across the countries, it is interesting to note that there were other reasons for Japanese firms to come into India. However, among the firms studied, Toyota Kirloskar Motors (TKM), Satake and Koyo had come to India in the past and tested Indian waters but their experiences had not been rewarding. Toyota had partnered a joint venture with DCM to build light commercial vehicles branded 'DCM Toyota'. They found the outing very tiring, as DCM's approach to the partnership was very high-handed. This resulted in a lot of friction. Thus, when DCM decided to tie up with Daewoo, Toyota called off the partnership. Koyo had a joint venture partnership with a state unit in Andhra Pradesh and incurred huge losses due to operational inefficiencies and bureaucratic indifference. Satake, too, had a poor experience in India. To test the Indian market, it had sent 25 units of rice processing mill machinery in knocked-down form to the Government of India under open bidding. Of the 25 units shipped through a shipping agency of Indian origin, only 12 units were supplied. The others went unaccounted for. Furthermore, in a year's time, a product of an inferior quality with the same name as that used by Satake to market its product hit the Indian market. Satake reacted by turning away from the Indian market. When India opened its doors to FDI investment in 1991, these companies stayed away because their past experiences had made them hesitant and apprehensive about the possibility of sustained operations in India.

Low Cost Advantage: Located in South Asia, India has a large growing population and a sizeable number of the population who are educated and technically skilled and where labour costs are relatively low. This has encouraged multinationals to set up operations in India. Japanese multinationals were no different. However it should be remembered that for Japan there are many alternative destinations which could provide similar environment. By 1993, most South East Asian countries had seen influx of Japanese investment. Most of the ventures had been a win-win situation for both Japanese multinationals and the local host. Thus destination India had to provide a little more than this simple cost advantage. It is interesting to note here that Kyocera choosing India as a destination, apart from low cost semi trained skilled workers was that the Indian workforce was English speaking and thus servicing the European client was cheaper and easier.

Market: While low cost advantage for Japan exists in many of the South East Asian countries and its immediate neighbours like South Korea and China, for Honda and Toyota, the Indian domestic market with a growing consumerism was an important reason to locate in India. In 1993, Honda took the risk of investing in India and set up its operations in 1995. Known for being a maverick company in Japan, Honda felt that early entry would help in penetrating the Indian market. Further, it had the foresight to rightly target the upper segment of the income group in India in which the desire for plush big cars had been curtailed during the previous regime. Toyota, because of reasons explained earlier, felt the disadvantage of late entry. However with savvy market study they were able to penetrate Indian market. Eisai's reason for entry was also centred on the volume of its business. Further, with Indian policy makers giving importance to medical tourism, Eisai saw it as an opportunity to make an early claim on the market.

The Jones' Effect: Among the companies studied, the late entrants were also motivated by their competitor's success. While Toyota's effort to establish itself was motivated by two main Japanese competitors namely Suzuki and Honda, a company like Satake was influenced by its German competitor's success in India.

Feasibility Study: In spite of the above advantages as a step to enter India, each of these firms conducted detailed feasibility surveys. Most of them used McKinsey or Ernest & Young for evaluation of some parameters. Satake was the only company that had used the Japanese trading company Marubeni and Mitsubishi. The locations identified by the survey teams considered factors such as proximity to a national highway, port or airport, as the need might be, as well as the available infrastructure--from land to telephone connectivity, water supply, internal roads, sewage system, tax holidays, specific requirements and availability of low cost labour as well as skilled manpower. For the automobile and chemical companies, the promises made by the state governments also played a crucial role.

Physical Location: India, for all of the eight companies, was geographically located in an advantageous position as it lay between the East and West. Further, with global activities most Japanese multinationals were sourcing a global workforce. India had the advantage of being a low cost country with most industrial hubs providing a lifestyle quite up to the international standard. Thus locating in India was advantageous.

As discussed, India had also worked on improving its image as an attractive destination. Green-field areas in India are usually chosen by the state government to promote industrial development. There are broadly two types of zones namely, 'industrial development zones' to give impetus to certain prominent sectors like automobiles electronics and technology parks for the software industry and 'export processing zones' dedicated to those manufacturing units which plan to export some part of their products. In 1995 when India opened up its economy, Japanese multinationals were riding high on their success in transnational operations. India too was keen on Japanese participation as they had respect for Japan as an Asian giant as also because its political relationship with Japan was cordial. The Maruti Suzuki venture had also created a lot of trust for Japanese partnership. Thus in 1995 one saw many Japanese multinationals setting up manufacturing units in India. All the Japanese multinational chose green-field areas for their operations in India because this gave them certain advantages. The state governments favoured the Japanese firms as they were major investors and the respective state governments were more cordial to their demands, giving them the advantage in negotiation. Further, by positioning themselves in locations earmarked for industrial development or special economic zones, they took the advantage of taxation and land utilisation policies. Green-field areas also gave them the benefit of sourcing raw talent, thus helping them to promote the Japanese method of management.

Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation (MCC) is a case in point. Despite having other options for locations, MCC's decision to locate in West Bengal has always intrigued observers, since the state has a communist government--a factor that is perceived as a deterrent to attracting FDI. The various project teams from MCC that visited India during 1994-96 essentially looked at coastal states which had port facilities. In Haldia, they found Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL), an Indian public sector company, already in a similar field of operation. They also found that George Soros held some shares of HPCL. Moreover, Haldia was close to their Thailand operation. Besides, the proximity of West Bengal to the textile industry in Eastern India and Bangladesh was an important consideration. Since its major competitors were based in western India, MCC felt that an operation in the east would help them gain the markets in the north and north-east as well. The lush green environment with large water bodies in Haldia was an added attraction. All these factors played a role in finalising Haldia as a preferred location.

While business considerations were the primary factors in the choice of location, the local climate also played a part in some cases. Toyota, for instance, had a choice between Chennai and Bangalore; it was the climate of Bangalore that tilted the decision in its favour. Above and beyond, many companies also factored in expatriate lifestyles to select their locations.

Partnership: Companies like Honda and Toyota took the entry mode of joint ventures with Indian business houses to operate in India. Considerable time was spent by them in identifying compatible business partners. Compatibility was sought not only in the financial capacity of the partners but also in their philosophy towards business, their attitude towards work and their interest in Japan and Japanese management. Further, the individual personality of the Indian partner also played a role in the signing of the joint venture document. They then used their partners to establish links with the bureaucracy and state political outfits. Honda, which came to India in the first phase of liberalisation was allowed only 49 per cent equity participation but as and when the Indian government allowed for more equity participation Honda immediately increased its stakes and today it stands at 51 per cent. Honda has always maintained that it would increase its stakes as it gives them more rights legally. However, as far as the car segment is concerned, Honda preferred to maintain the very harmonious relationship with its partner instead of buying the partner out. Since Toyota came in after 2001, they thus began with 51 per cent equity participation.

Sona Koyo Steering initially started operations as a vendor to Maruti Udhyog Limited, a joint venture of government of India with Suzuki Japan. This venture was set up in 1985 under the policy of pure invitation by the government of India. Suzuki as a partner insisted on using components produced by its vendors in the first lot of its production. However, the agreement had insisted on indigenization of its components. As a move towards meeting its promise, Suzuki helped its vendors to find partners in India under technical collaboration. Koyo Seiko was a trusted vendor of Suzuki and Suzuki desired its partnership in India. However because of its past experience Koyo only attempted a temporary arrangement with Sona Steering to provide technical help by training its engineers in 1985. This small step grew into a partnership overtime resulting in making this company one of the best with respect to quality and efficiency in its industrial sector.

MCC and Eisai followed a more conventional entry strategy. It was considered too risky to set up a distribution channel for a drug that would be sold as an over the counter drug by chemists. MCC started to export Purified Terephthalic Acid (PTA- a chemical essential for textile industry) into India from 1993 and Eisai got into a licensing agreement with Glaxo Smith Kline and Unichem for the sale of two of its most popular drugs. By resorting to this option, both companies feel that they profited by understanding both the market and the nuances of administrative issues, albeit indirectly.

While entering India MCC intended to follow the Maruti Udyog limited strategy of finding a government partner as Maruti had benefited from it. Being in the chemical industry and producing PTA where there were no foreign players it wanted to cover any externalities through a government partnership. Further, its main competitor was an Indian company called Reliance which was known for its alliance with political power and the bureaucracy. Having considered all these factors it went in for a government partnership.

Apart from the locational advantage envisaged with respect to West Bengal, the clinching point was the keen interest shown by the Government of West Bengal in attracting MCC. During negotiations with the government, MCC found them to be cordial, sympathetic to MCC's needs and eager to provide external support to make the Japanese giant's Indian operations a success. Indeed, the issue of labour was a major concern, but the Government of West Bengal repeatedly assured MCC that it would extend all possible help to establish congenial labour relations. It was the state Communist government's strong cadre base in Haldia that boosted MCC's confidence in setting up base in Haldia since it was felt that this provided it some insurance against sabotage or opposition from the local population. MCC PTA India decided to have the West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation among its minor shareholders with a 5 per cent stake. Through this strategy, it was assumed that MCC PTA India would be able to iron out operational bottlenecks with respect to dedicated oil pipelines and human resources.

According to YKK it was keen to operate India since the 1950s. During the 1960s it had sent a mission to India to look at prospect of an entry. However the industrial policy of India had placed metallic zipper industry under small scale industry. Thus entry to YKK was denied. In 1996, the zipper industry was moved from small scale industry to large and medium scale industry. Seeing this opportunity YKK entered and established itself. To YKK, this move had an added advantage in that it was granted wholly owned subsidiary at the outset


Japanese Multinationals have known to flock together into a country and set up operations. This clustering was often directed by its MITI (now known as METI). However in the case of investing in India, no such trend can be seen. Rather, the driving force for the early entrants has been their foresight on opportunities in India and for the later entrants it was the success of their competitors. Having been successful in their outings in other countries, the Japanese companies have entered India after a thorough investigation for which they have taken the help of renowned consultant companies. A significant change has been that other than Satake, the companies had used consultant firms of other countries. Mitsubishi used the strategy of exporting to India before starting a business operation, and Eisai used a distribution partner to gain understanding of Indian markets. Honda, Toyota, and MCC chose the option of joint ventures. In joint ventures the partnership was concluded not because of fulfilment of financial needs but rather because of comfort level of the Japanese top management with their counterparts in India. Sona Koyo Steering partnership shows yet another dimension. By forming a tentative alliance of providing technology today, the partnership rests on equality between the partners. YKK found that it was viable to enter India when the Indian government allowed wholly-owned subsidiaries. An interesting observation is that due to the changes in foreign investment policy although Honda and Koyo have the option of buying out their Indian partners they have not done so as they appreciate the relationships which is beyond economic or financial considerations. Strategically, all of them located themselves in green-field areas to build on the advantages in terms of assistance offered by the government and sourcing of raw talent that could be moulded. They believed that by locating their companies in green-field areas, they could promote the philosophy of Japanese management into their operations which continues to be vital for Japanese multinationals.


Primary Sources:

* FICCI (2002), "Investment Environment in India-A survey of Japanese Investors" Report -Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries, New Delhi.

* JETRO White Paper on "Outward Foreign Direct Investment" Various Issues.

* Press Note No.1 (2005).Department of Industrial Planning and Promotion, New Delhi India. Available at www.dipp.go.in.

* SIA News Letter (2007), "FDI Synopsis on Japan" Department of Industrial Planning and Promotion, New Delhi India. Available at www.dipp.go.in.

Secondary Sources:

* Bala Komaraiah, J,(2003), "India-Japan Business Relations in the 21st Century", in Japan's Role in South East Asia M.D Dharamdasini (ed.), Lancer Books, New Delhi.

* Bartlett, C.A., Gita Piramal, Sumantra Ghoshal, (2000), "Managing Radical Change", Viking, New Delhi.

* Belzowski, Bruce. M, et. al, (2007), "Inside India: Indians View their Automotive Future", IBM Institute for Business Value.

* Delios, Andrew, et.al, (2008), "Political Hazards, Experience and Sequential Entry Strategies: The International Expansion of Japanese Firms", 1980-1998, Strategic Management Journal, 20(8):711-727.

* Hideki Yamawaki, (2007), "Japanese Exports and Foreign Direct Investment: Imperfect Competition in International Markets", Cambridge University Press.

* IBEF's (2007) "India-Japan: A Little Japan in India", available at www.ibef.org.

* Japan Bank for International Cooperation, (2008), "Survey Report on Overseas Business Operations by Japanese Manufacturing Companies".

* Japan Bank for International Cooperation, (2002), "Foreign Direct Investment and Development: Where Do We Stand?" Research Paper no: 15.

* Kim, Bonghoon, (2009), "Recent Trends and Prospects of FDI in India," available at gators@maxtin.co.kr

* Makino, Shige, et. al. (2004), "The Characteristics and Performance of Japanese FDI in Less Developed and Developed Countries", Journal of World Business, 39(4):377 392.

* Nagraj, R. (2003), "Foreign Direct Investment in India in the 1990s: Trends and Issues", Economic Political Weekly Review, India, 38 : 1701-1712

* Patrick, Oskarsson, (2005), "India Attraction: Profitable Multinationals as Subsidy Junkies-A Study of Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment in India", Finnwatch, Finland.

* Narula Rajneesh, Lall Sanjay, (2006), (ed.), "Understanding FDI-Assisted Economic Development", London: Routledge.

Selected Web Sites

World Bank, Delhi, India, available at www.worldbank.org.in Japan Bank for International Cooperation, available at www.jbic.go.jp/en/

Doing Business 2009, available at www.doingbusiness.aol

Japan External Trade Organisation, available at http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/

Toyota Kirloskar Motor Ltd., available at http://www.toyotabharat.com/

Honda Siel Pvt Ltd., available at http://www.hondacarindia.com

Sona Koyo Steering Ltd., available at http://www.sonagroup.com/

YKK India Pvt. Ltd., available at http://ykkindia.com

Eisai pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., available at www.eisai.co.jp

Kyocera wireless India Ltd., available at http://www.kyocera-wireless.com

Mitsubishi Chemical Corporation PTA, India, available athttp://www.mitsubi shicorp.com

Satake India Engineering Ltd., available at http://www.satakeindia.com/index.asp

(i) Website of department of Industrial Policy and Promotion

(ii) A Nidhi company is a company registered under Companies Act and notified as a nidhi company by Central Government under Section 620-A of Companies Act. It is a non-banking finance company doing the business of lending and borrowing with its members or shareholders.

Srabani Roy Choudhury, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Table1: Profiles of the Selected Firms

Name of Firms             Year of           Product
                        of Japanese

YKK                        1934        Zippers

Honda Siel Pvt. Ltd        1948        Light automobiles

Sona Koyo Steering         1929        Auto components

Satake India               1896        Rice mill
Engineering Ltd                        equipment

Kyocera Wireless           2000        Mrjbile system
India ltd

Mitsubishi Chemical        1950        PTA Chemical
Corporation PTA

Toyota Kirloskar           1934        Light vehicle
Matar Ltd

Eisai                      1936        Drugs
Pharmaceuticals Pvt

Name of Firms            Nature of          Location

YKK                    Subsidiary       Delhi

Honda Siel Pvt. Ltd    Joint venture    Greater Nd ida,
                                        Uttar Pradesh

Sona Koyo Steering     Technical        Gurgacn, Haryana
                       Joint venture

Satake India           Subsidiary       Delhi
Engineering Ltd

Kyocera Wireless       Subsidiary       Bangabre,
India ltd                               Kamataka

Mitsubishi Chemical    Joint venture    Kclkata.West
Corporation PTA                         Bengal

Toyota Kirloskar       Subsidiary       Bangabre,
Matar Ltd                               Kamataka

Eisai                  Subsidiary       Murnbai,
Pharmaceuticals Pvt                     Maharashtra

Name of Firms            Plant Location         Year of
                                            Establishment of
                                             Indian Entity

YKK                    Haryana                    1997

Honda Siel Pvt. Ltd    Greater Noida,             1995
                       Uttar Pradesh

Sona Koyo Steering     Gurgaon, Haryana           1985

Satake India           Not applicable             1996
Engineering Ltd

Kyocera Wireless       Not applicable             2003
India ltd

Mitsubishi Chemical    Haldia West                1997
Corporation PTA        Bengal

Toyota Kirloskar       Bangalore district         1997
Matar Ltd

Eisai                  Vizag, Andhra              2004
Pharmaceuticals Pvt    Pradesh
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